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Abstract: This paper studies the macroeconomic eﬀects of implicit government guarantees of the 
obligations of government-sponsored enterprises. We construct a model with competitive housing and 
mortgage markets in which the government provides banks with insurance against aggregate shocks to 
mortgage default risk. We use this model to evaluate aggregate and distributional impacts of this 
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With close to 70% the United States displays one of the highest home ownership ratios in the
world. Part of the attractiveness of owner-occupied housing stems from a variety of subsidies
the government provides to homeowners. Apart from direct subsidies to low-income households
via the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs, three important
indirect subsidies exist. The ﬁrst - and most well known - is the fact that mortgage interest
payments (of mortgages up to $1 million) are tax-deductible. Second, the implicit income from
housing capital (i.e. the imputed rental-equivalent) is not taxable, while other forms of capi-
tal income (e.g. interest, dividend and capital gains income) are being taxed. Gervais (2001)
addresses the adverse eﬀects of these two subsidies within a general equilibrium life-cycle model.
The third subsidy arises from the special structure of the US mortgage market. A large frac-
tion of conventional conforming home mortgages in the US are being sold in the market with a
guarantee provided by Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) or purchased from individual
banks for the GSEs’ own portfolios. A formidable summary of the institutional details surround-
ing GSEs can be found in Frame and Wall (2002a) and (2002b). The three most important
GSE are the two privately owned and publicly traded companies Fannie Mae (Federal National
Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association), and the
FHLB (Federal Home Loan Bank system), a public and non-proﬁt organization. According to
Frame and Wall (2002a), citing a 2001 study by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO), Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac alone had a share of 39% of all home mortgages and a share of 71% among
ﬁxed-rate conforming mortgages.
The close link of GSEs to the federal government creates the impression that the government
provides a guarantee to GSEs shielding them from aggregate risks, most notably aggregate credit
risk which lowers their reﬁnancing cost to below what private institutions would have to pay.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the macroeconomic and distributional eﬀects of this
subsidy; our paper is - to our knowledge - the ﬁrst attempt to do so within a structural dynamic
general equilibrium model.
According to Frame and Wall, GSEs enjoy an array of government beneﬁts, for example a
line of credit with the Treasury Department and very importantly a special status of GSE-issued
debt. In particular, GSE securities can serve as substitutes to government bonds for transactions
between public entities that normally require to be done in Treasuries. The Federal Reserve
System also accepts GSE debt as a substitute for Treasuries in their portfolio of repurchase
agreements. While no written federal guarantee for GSE debt exists, market participants view
the special status of GSE debt as an indication of an implicit guarantee making them almost
as safe as Treasury bills. The perception of a federal guarantee is further fueled by the sheer
size of the GSE mortgage portfolio amounting to about 3 trillion dollars, 2.4 trillion dollars of
which coming from the larger two GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Insolvency of any one
or both of these companies, say, due to an adverse shock in the real estate market that increases
aggregate mortgage delinquency, will cause major disruptions in the ﬁnancial system, which is
why market participants consider housing GSEs to be too large to fail. Finally, two previous
government bailouts of housing GSEs - Fannie Mae in the early 1980s and one of the smaller
housing GSEs in the late 1980s - are further evidence that a bailout is likely should housing
GSEs get into ﬁnancial trouble.
The implicit federal guarantee is more than mere perception; most importantly, it is reﬂected
1in interest rates GSEs pay when borrowing. GSEs can borrow at rates only marginally higher
than the Treasury but about 40 basis points lower than private companies without a government
guarantee, according to the Congressional Budget Oﬃce CBO (2001). This is despite the fact that
GSEs are highly leveraged entities with an equity cushion of only about 3% of their obligations,
much lower than the 8.45% in the thrift industry (ﬁgures taken from Frame and Wall (2002a)).
A lively discussion ensued about how much of the subsidy is actually passed on to homeowners.
Passmore et. al. (2004) argue that GSEs reduce mortgage rates by only about 0.07 percentage
points, while the rest of the subsidy goes to GSE shareholders, raising doubts about the GSEs’
self-proclaimed aim of making housing more aﬀordable. Blinder (2004) on the other hand defends
the GSEs and argues that they indeed pass on essentially the entire subsidy to homeowners.
Besides making a methodological and theoretical contribution, our paper gives a new angle at
this discussion. Speciﬁcally, we conduct the following thought experiment: Suppose the entire
subsidy is indeed passed on to homeowners, just as the GSEs and Blinder (2004) claim, then
what is the economic impact, especially on households of diﬀerent income and wealth holdings?
In our study we focus solely on an interest rate subsidy provided in the form of an implicit
government guarantee, that is, we study the usefulness of a subsidy separately from any other
programs, such as aﬀordable housing programs run by the GSEs.
In order to assess the macroeconomic and distributional eﬀects of this subsidy we construct
a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model in which households can default on their mort-
gages. Aggregate mortgage delinquency rates are impacted by aggregate shocks to the housing
and labor market. Our aim is to compare two economies, one in which the aggregate risk is priced
into mortgages and one economy in which the government oﬀers a tax-ﬁnanced bailout in case
of a bad aggregate shock, that is, the aggregate delinquency risk is not priced into mortgages.
In this way we capture the essence of the guarantee structure that GSEs enjoy without the need
to explicitly model the behavior of these institutions. As a ﬁrst step towards this goal in this
paper we analyze the macroeconomic and distributional consequences of a tax-ﬁnanced direct
subsidy to mortgage interest rates. In our thought experiment, as well as in an approach that
models aggregate uncertainty explicitly the government subsidizes home ownership by reducing
eﬀective mortgage interest rates in exactly the same way. Thus we feel that our abstraction
from aggregate uncertainty reduces the numerical complexity of the model without losing the
main eﬀects and insights for the question at hand. Evidently, an explicit study with aggregate
uncertainty has to conﬁrm this conjecture.
Our preliminary results can be described as follows. First, the subsidy leads to an increase in
household investment in housing assets and an increase in the construction of real estate. Using
a steady state utilitarian social welfare functional we ﬁnd that the aggregate welfare implications
of the subsidy are mildly positive, in the order of 0.1% of consumption equivalent variation. The
results also suggest that households with low wealth prefer to live in an economy without subsidy
while high wealth households beneﬁt strongly from it, indicating adverse distributional eﬀects of
the reform.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
deﬁnes equilibrium in an economy with a housing and mortgage market. Section 3 characterizes
equilibria. Section 4 describes the calibration of an economy without aggregate uncertainty
1Gruber and Martin (2003) also study the distributional eﬀects of the inclusion of housing wealth in a general
equilibrium model, but do not address the role of government housing subsidies for this question.
2and with a direct subsidy on mortgage interest rates. Section 5 details the numerical results
comparing two steady states in economies with and without a mortgage interest subsidy. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The endowment economy is populated by a continuum of measure one of inﬁnitely lived house-
holds, a continuum of competitive banks and a continuum of housing construction companies.
Households face idiosyncratic endowment and housing depreciation shocks. In addition there
may be aggregate shocks aﬀecting endowments and housing depreciation. In what follows we
will immediately proceed to describing the economy recursively, thereby skipping the (standard)
sequential formulation of the economy.
2.1 Households
Households have endowment of the perishable consumption good given by yz. The aggregate part
of endowments z ∈ Z follows a ﬁnite state Markov chain with transition probabilities π(z0|s) and
unique invariant distribution Π(z). The idiosyncratic part of endowments y ∈ Y follows a ﬁnite
state Markov chain with transition probabilities π(y0|y,z0,z) and unique invariant distribution
Πz(y). That is, the distribution over idiosyncratic income shocks is allowed to depend on the
aggregate state of the economy.
Households derive period utility U(c,h) from consumption and housing services h, which
can be purchased at a price pl (relative to the numeraire consumption good). In addition to
consumption and housing services the household can purchase two types of assets, one period
bonds b0 and houses g0. T h ep r i c eo fb o n d si sd e n o t e db yPb and the price of houses by Ph. Whereas
households cannot short-sell bonds, they can borrow against their real estate property. Let by
m0 denote the size of their mortgage, and by Pm the receipt of resources (the consumption good)
for each unit of mortgage issued and to be repaid tomorrow. These receipts will be determined
in equilibrium by competition of banks, and will depend on the characteristics of households as
well as the size of the mortgage m0 and size of the collateral g0. Houses depreciate stochastically;
let Fδ,z0,y0(δ
0) denote the cumulative distribution function of the depreciation rate δ
0 tomorrow,
which has support D =[ δ,¯ δ] and may depend on the realized depreciation rate δ today as
well as on the endowment realization of the household (z0,y 0). Households possess the option of
defaulting on their mortgages, at the cost of losing their housing collateral. They will choose to
do so whenever
m
0 >P h(1 − δ
0)g
0
If there is a government bailout guarantee, then the government obtains general tax revenues by
levying proportional taxes τ on endowments. It will use the receipts from these taxes to bail out
part of the mortgages that private households have defaulted on. Finally let a denote cash at
hand, that is, after tax endowment plus receipts from all assets brought into the period.
The individual state of a household consists of s =( a,δ,y), which reduces to s = a in the
case where idiosyncratic endowments and housing depreciation are iid. Let the cross-sectional
distribution over individual states be given by µ; the aggregate state of the economy then consists
3of (z,µ). The dynamic programming problem of a household reads as
















































with µ0 = T(z,z0,µ). Note that the budget constraint implies the timing convention that newly
purchased real estate g0 can immediately be rented out in the same period. The function T
describes the aggregate law of motion.
2.2 The Real Estate Construction Sector
Firms in the real estate construction sector act competitively and face the linear technology
I = AhCh
where I is the output of houses of a representative ﬁrm, Ch is the input of the consumption
good and Ah is a technological constant, measuring the amount of consumption goods required
to build one house. For now we assume that this technology is reversible, that is, real estate
companies can turn houses back into consumption goods using the same technology. Thus the
problem of a representative ﬁrm reads as
max
I,Ch
Ph(z;µ)I − Ch (2)
s.t.
I = AhCh





2.3 The Banking Sector
W ea s s u m et h a tt h er i s kf r e ei n t e r e s tr a t eo no n e - p e r i o db o n d srb is exogenously given; one may
interpret our economy as a small open economy. Thus Pb = 1
1+rb is exogenously given as well,
which is equal to the reﬁnancing costs of the banking sector. In addition we assume that issuing
mortgages is costly; let rw be the percentage real resource cost, per unit of mortgage issued, to
the bank. This cost captures screening costs, administrative costs as well as maintenance costs of
the mortgage (such as preparing and mailing a quarterly mortgage balance). As a consequence,
the eﬀective net cost of the banking sector for ﬁnancing one dollar of mortgage, equals rb + rw.
Mortgage receipts Pm for a mortgage of size m0 against real estate of size g0 are determined by
perfect competition in the banking sector, which implies that banks make zero expected proﬁts
for each mortgage they issue (as in Chatterjee et al. (2002)). Banks take account of the fact that
4household may default on their mortgage, in which case the bank recovers the collateral value
of the house, which we assume to be a fraction γ ≤ 1 of the value of the real estate. For ease
of exposition we assume that the cost of mortgage generation is paid not when the mortgage is
issued, but when it repaid, which implies that households defaulting on their mortgage payments
also default on paying for the cost of generating the mortgage. Since this cost is fully priced into
the mortgage, this is equivalent to assuming that the resource cost of mortgage issue is due at
the receipt of the mortgage, but makes notation less cumbersome.
In order to deﬁne a typical banks’ problem we ﬁrst have to characterize the optimal default
choice of a household. The cut-oﬀ level of depreciation, above which a household defaults on
her mortgage is given as follows.. Deﬁne as κ0 = m0
g0 the leverage (for g0 > 0) of a mortgage m0
backed by real estate g0. Then if the default cut-oﬀ δ
∗(m0,g 0,z0,µ 0) is in the interior of D =[ δ,¯ δ]
it is given by
m























Ph(z0,µ0) if 1 − κ0
Ph(z0,µ0) ∈ [δ,¯ δ]
¯ δ if 1 − κ0
Ph(z0,µ0) > ¯ δ





∗(κ0), where, as before, κ0 is a function of (s,z,µ).
Evidently a household that obtains a mortgage m0 > 0 without collateral, i.e. with g0 =0
defaults for sure. The receipt for this mortgage thus necessarily has to equal 0 as well, i.e.
Pm(s,g0 =0 ,m 0,z,µ)=0 . For other types of mortgages (m0,g0) with m0 > 0 and g0 > 0, the















































In the presence of a government bailout, the government eﬀectively subsidizes mortgages, in
f o r m st ob es p e c i ﬁed below.
2.4 The Government
As stated above the government levies endowment taxes τ(z,µ) on households to subsidize mort-
gages. Subsidies take the form of direct interest rate subsidies.2







2Other forms of mortgage subsidies can be easily mapped into these interest rate subsidies.
5where Pm(s,g0,m 0,z,µ) is the mortgage pricing function without subsidy. Deﬁne as ˆ rm(s,g0,m 0,z,µ)
and ˆ Pm(s,g0,m 0,z,µ) the corresponding entities with subsidy. Since the subsidy is a mortgage


































sub(s,g0,m 0,z,µ)Pm (s,g0,m 0,z,µ)
1 − sub(s,g0,m 0,z,µ)Pm(s,g0,m 0,z,µ)
¶














where ¯ yz is average (aggregate) endowment if the aggregate state of the economy is z.
2.5 Equilibrium
We are now ready to deﬁne a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium. Let S = R+ × D × Y denote
the individual state space and M the space of ﬁnite measures over the measurable space (S,S),
where S = B(R+) ×B(D) ×P(Y ) and B is the Borel σ-algebra and P is the power set, so that
S is a well-deﬁned σ-algebra over S.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a government subsidy policy sub : S×R+×R+×Z×M→ R, a Recursive
Competitive Equilibrium are value and policy functions for the households, v,c,h,b0,m 0,g0 :
S×Z×M → R, policy functions for the real estate construction sector I,Ch : Z×M → R, pricing
functions Pl,P h,P b : Z×M → R, mortgage pricing functions Pm, ˆ Pm : S×R+×R+×Z×M → R,
a government tax policy τ : Z ×M→ R and an aggregate law of motion T : Z × Z ×M→ M
such that
1. (Household Maximization) Given prices Pl,P h,P b, ˆ Pm and government policies the value
function solves (1) and c,h,b0,m 0,g 0 are the associated policy functions.
62. (Real Estate Construction Company Maximization) Given Ph, policies I,Ch solve (2).
3. (Bank Maximization) Given Ph,P b, the function Pm solves (3)




where rb is the exogenously given ﬁxed world risk free interest rate
5. (Government Budget Balance) The tax rate function τ satisﬁes (4), given the functions
m0,P m, ˆ Pm,sub.






7. (Aggregate Law of Motion) The aggregate law of motion T is generated by the exogenous
Markov processes π and the policy functions m0,g 0,b 0
When we derive the welfare consequences of removing the mortgage interest subsidy, we




3T h e o r e t i c a l R e s u l t s
In this section we state theoretical properties of our model the use of which makes the computa-
tion of the model easier. These results consist of a characterization of the mortgage interest rate,
a partial characterization of the solution to the household maximization problem and, ﬁnally,
bounds on the equilibrium rental price Pl(z,h).
3.1 Mortgage Interest Rates
From equation (3) and the fact that competition requires proﬁts for all mortgages issued in


























































We note the following facts:
1. Besides the aggregate state variables the only information determining mortgage interest
rates are the individual states δ,y and the leverage of the mortgage κ0 = m0
g0 . If income
and depreciation shocks are iid, then Pm(s,κ0(s)) = Pm(κ0(s),z) and mortgages are priced
exclusively based on leverage and aggregate conditions. Furthermore, if aggregate shocks
are iid, then mortgage prices and interest rates only depend on the leverage of the mortgage
chosen by the household, κ0(s).
2. Pm(s,z,κ0(s)) is decreasing in κ0, strictly so if the household defaults with positive proba-
bility. Thus mortgage interest rates are increasing in leverage κ0.
3. Households that repay their mortgage with probability one have δ






, i.e. they can borrow at the rate rb + rw.
4. Since for all δ
0 >δ
∗(κ0) we have γPhκ0(1−δ
0) < 1, households that do default with positive





today, that is, they borrow with
ar i s kp r e m i u mrm(s,z,κ0(s)) >r b + rw.
3.2 Simpliﬁcation of the Household Problem





˜ c + Pl(z,µ)h = c
Then the above problem can be rewritten as





















s.t. c + b
0Pb + g











0 +m a x {0,P h(1 − δ
0)g
0 − m








8For future reference, in the absence of aggregate uncertainty and with individual shocks being
iid the individual state variables collapse to just cash at hand a0 and the problem becomes














s.t. c + b
0Pb + g










0 +m a x {0,P h(1 − δ
0)g
0 − m
0)} +( 1− τ)y
0
3.3 Endogenous Borrowing Limit
We now want to show that it is never strictly beneﬁcial for a household to obtain a mortgage with
higher leverage than that level which will lead to default for sure. We will carry out the discussion
in the next two subsections for the case without government bailout policy; the analysis goes
through unchanged with government policy, mutatis mutandis. Remember that by construction
Ph(z0,µ 0)=Ph = 1




¯ κ =( 1 − ¯ δ)Ph =
1 − δ
Ah














0 [Ph − Pl(z,µ) − κ
0Pm(s,z,κ







0,z,µ)=Ph − Pl(z,µ) − κ
0Pm(s,κ
0,z)
is the is down payment per unit of real estate purchased, net of rental income. With this deﬁnition
the total down payment for a house of size g0 is given by g0P(s,κ0,z,µ)

























































=¯ κPm(s, ¯ κ,z,µ)
9and thus leveraging further does not bring extra revenues today and does not change resources
obtained tomorrow (since the household defaults for sure and thus loses all real estate).3 That
is, the household faces an endogenous eﬀective borrowing constraint of the form
κ









One can interpret 1 − ¯ κ as the minimum down payment requirement in this economy.
3.4 Bounds on the Equilibrium Rental Price of Housing
3.4.1 An Upper Bound
Evidently for all admissible choices of the household it has to be the case that P(s,κ0,z,µ) ≥ 0,
otherwise the household can obtain positive cash ﬂow today by buying a house; the default option
on the mortgage guarantees that the cash ﬂow from the house tomorrow is non-negative. Thus,
the absence of this arbitrage in equilibrium requires P(s,κ0,z,µ) ≥ 0. Therefore in particular
P(s,κ
0 =¯ κ,z,µ)=Ph − Pl(z,µ) − ¯ κPm(s,κ
0 =¯ κ,z) ≥ 0
But
P(s, ¯ κ,z,µ)=Ph − Pl(z,µ) − ¯ κPm(s, ¯ κ,z)































which places an upper bound on the equilibrium rental price.
Thus









rb + rw + γEδ,y,z(δ)+1− γ
1+rb + rw
¸




3The household is obviously indiﬀerent between choosing κ0 =¯ κ and κ0 > ¯ κ; from here on we resolve any
indiﬀerence of the household by assuming that in this case he chooses κ0 =¯ κ.
103.4.2 A Lower Bound
Housing is an inherently risky asset. Since households are risk averse, for them to purchase the
housing asset the expected return of housing at zero leverage has to be at least as high as the

















0) ≥ Ph − Pl(z,µ)







0)) ≥ Ph − Pl(z,µ) or
Pl(z,µ) ≥ Ph
·




which states that the rental price of housing cannot be smaller than the (expected) user cost of
housing in equilibrium (otherwise nobody would invest in housing, which cannot be an equilib-
rium given strictly positive demand for housing services by consumers).4
In summary, what these theoretical results buy us, besides being interesting in its own right,
is a simpliﬁed household problem, a concise characterization of the high-dimensional equilibrium
mortgage interest rate function and bounds for the equilibrium rental price, the only endogenous
p r i c et ob ed e t e r m i n e di no u ra n a l y s i s .
4C a l i b r a t i o n
4.1 Technology
Summary
Parameter Interpretation Value Target
Ah Technology Const. in Housing Constr. 1.0 none (normalized)
π Transition Matrix for Income see below Tauchen ρ =0 .98,σe =0 .30
y Income States see below Tauchen ρ =0 .98,σe =0 .30
µδ Depreciation 0.0199 E (δ)=0 .0148
σδ Std. Dev. of Depreciation 0.10 OFHEO volatility
¯ δ Upper Bound on Depreciation 0.3429 1 − exp{−µδ − 4σδ}
δ Lower Bound on Depreciation −0.4624 1 − exp{−µδ +4 σδ}
γ Foreclosure Technology 0.78 Pennington and Cross (2004)
4Without aggregate uncertainty and γ =1we thus immediately obtain that the rental price of housing Pl





. In fact, what happens in this equilibrium is that households purchase
houses, leverage such that they default for sure tomorrow and the houses end up in the hand of the banks. Since
these are risk-neutral, default is fully priced into the mortgage and banks receive the full (depreciated) value of
the house, banks rather than households (which are risk averse) should and will end up owning the real estate.
11Foreclosure technology The default technology parameter γ has been estimated by Pennington-
Cross (2004) who looks at the sales revenue from foreclosed houses and compares it to a market
price constructed via the OFHEO repeat sales index. He ﬁnds that on average the loss is 22%.
The loss varies only slightly depending on the age of the loan, between 20% for loans 16-20
months old to 26% f o rl o a n su pt o1 0m o n t h so l d ,s oi ti ss a f et oa s s u m et h a ti nt h em o d e l
γ =0 .78 for all loans.
The depreciation process The Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)
models house prices as a diﬀusion process and estimates within-state and within-region annual
house price volatility. The technical details can be found in the paper by Calhoun (1996). The
ballpark ﬁgure for the eight census regions is 9 − 10% volatility in the years 1998-2004. We
use the upper bound σδ =0 .10 to account for the fact that nationwide volatility is slightly
higher than the within-region volatility. Assume that (1 − δ) is log-normally distributed, that
is, log(1 − δ) ∼ N (−µδ,σ2
δ). The average depreciation for residential housing according to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis was 1.48% between 1960 and 2002 (standard deviation 0.05%),
computed as consumption of ﬁxed capital in the housing sector (Table 7.4.5) divided by the







set µδ = 1
2σ2
δ − log0.9852 ≈ 1.99% in order to match the average depreciation of 1.48%.
In the program we have to truncate the support for δ to [δl,δh]. We draw log(1 − δ) from a
range of ±4 standard deviations around µδ. This makes sure that the moments of the simulated
truncated distribution are indistinguishable from theoretical moments and also the probabilities
of drawing from the far right tail of the distribution - depreciation rates high enough to trigger
default - are close enough to their theoretical values:
Analytical Truncated
E (δ) 0.0148 0.0149
St.dev. 0.1000 0.0999
P (δ ≥ 0.20) 0.021055 0.021024
P (δ ≥ 0.25) 0.003705 0.003674
P (δ ≥ 0.30) 0.000379 0.000347
Housing Technology We normalize the housing construction constant to Ah =1 .0, and thus
the price of one unit of housing to unity.
Income process For a continuous state AR(1) process of the form
logy











we can calculate the unconditional standard deviation to be σe and the one-period autocorrelation
(persistence) to be ρ. Estimates for ρ range from [0.53,1] where the lower number is somewhat
of an outlier. We choose ρ =0 .98. The estimates for the standard deviation range from 0.2 to
0.4, so we pick σε =0 .3.
12We approximate the continuous state AR(1) with a 5 state Markov chain using the pro-
cedure put forth by Tauchen and Hussey (1991). We get the ﬁve labor productivity shocks
y ∈ {0.3586,0.5626,0.8449,1.2689,1.9909} and the following transition matrix:
Π =

   

0.7629 0.2249 0.0121 0.0001 0.0000
0.2074 0.5566 0.2207 0.0152 0.0001
0.0113 0.2221 0.5333 0.2221 0.0113
0.0001 0.0152 0.2207 0.5566 0.2074
0.0000 0.0001 0.0121 0.2249 0.7629

   

which generates the stationary distribution (0.190722,0.206633,0.205290,0.206633,0.190722) and
average labor productivity of one.
4.2 Preferences
For the utility function we start with a CES functional form:
u(c,h)=( 1− β)















which implies that in steady state θ and ν cannot be pinned down at the same time. We therefore




which allows us to easily calibrate θ to the share of housing vs. non-housing consumption.
Summary
Parameter Interpretation Value Target
σ Risk Aversion 2.60 Bond portfolio shares
β Time Discount Factor 0.90 Net Worth/Income
θ Share Parameter on Nondur. Cons. 0.86 Exp. Share in Data
Details The risk aversion and time discount parameters are calibrated to match targets in the
data using the benchmark economy without aggregate uncertainty. We use data from the Survey
of Consumer Finances and restrict our attention to only bonds and net real estate, that is real
estate holdings net of mortgages, and compute the bond share and net worth to income ratio as
a) the unrestricted mean over all households, b) the restricted mean of all households having a
13net worth smaller than 50 times median income5 and c) the mean within the median net worth
bin using 25 equally-sized bins along household net worth. The results are reported below:
unrestricted mean restricted mean median bin
Bond Share 0.4473 0.3854 0.2832
Net worth / income 2.7733 2.2666 1.2137
One can see from this table that bond shares and net worth ratios are aﬀected a lot by extremely
high net worth households. Since we will have trouble matching the skewness of the wealth
distribution we decided to match the moments at the median household. Using σ =2 .6 and
β =0 .9 generates a bond share of around 26% and a net worth to income ratio of about 1.40
which as good an approximation to the data as we can obtain for now.6
The share of housing in total consumption θ is set to generate a realistic share of housing in
total consumption which has been steady at 14% over the last 40 years with a standard deviation
of only about 0.5%. Hence, we set θ =0 .86.
4.3 Policy and Markets
Summary
Parameter Interpretation Value Target
sub Implicit Interest Rate Subsidy 40 BP Passmore
rb Risk Free Interest Rate on Bonds 0.01 1 year real return on TIPS
Details On the interest rate subsidy we take the view that the pass-through is 100% to make
the case for the GSEs as positive as possible. The subsidy is then chosen to match the estimated
implicit interest rate diﬀerential of around 40 basis points.
The risk-free interest rate is set to the real return on risk-free government bonds with maturity
equal to the length of model period, that is, probably a year. 1% is a reasonable estimate.
5R e s u l t s
In this section we document results from our thought experiment, that is, we compare steady
states of economies with and without a mortgage interest rates subsidy of 40 basis points. Table
I summarizes the main macroeconomic aggregates
5This would eliminate the top 0.93% of the wealth distribution.
6The problem with matching the two emppricial statistics with the two preference parameters is the following.
T h et i m ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rβ is eﬀective in controlling the wealth to output ration in the model, so reducing β
further below 0.9 allows us to match that statistic. Unfortunately β exerts strong inﬂuence also on the bond
portfolio share that drops further as β declines (households with little savings hold no or very little bonds, see
below for an explanation). While higher risk aversion σ favors bonds as the safe asset, increasing σ is not too
helpful because it increases precautionary saving and hence the welath-output ratio, counteracting the eﬀect of
lowering β.
14Table 1: Consequences of Removing the Subsidy
Variable Subsidy No Subsidy Diﬀerence
Pl 0.033911 0.036008 +6.1838%
H 4.396227 4.163278 -5.2988%
M 3.100073 2.517359 -18.7968%
Default share 0.001715 0.001297 -24.3732%
median net worth 1.4048 1.3812 -1.6800%
Wealth Gini 0.4761 0.4737 -0.0024
Sub/¯ y 0.012276 0.0000 -0.012276
µ(g0 > 0) 0.9370 0.9422 0.5550%
µ(g0 >h ) 0.4007 0.3978 -0.7237%
EV SS -0.8733 -0.8742 -0.065% c.e.7
We see that removing the subsidy decreases the equilibrium housing stock and rental demand
H by about 5% and increases the rental price by over 6%. Households use far fewer mortgages
in the absence of the subsidy partially due to less housing consumption, but mainly due to lower
leverage. As a result, the subsidy has a very strong eﬀect on mortgage default rates, which are
substantially lower without the subsidy, as most households are less leveraged. The overall size
of the subsidy and thus the tax rate to ﬁnance it is quite substantial at about 1.3% of average
i n c o m e .T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a ta l lm o r t g a g e st h a ta r et a k e no u ti nt h i se c o n o m yr e c e i v et h e
subsidy.
Removing the subsidy reduces median net worth by about 1.7% and also reduces the wealth
Gini coeﬃcient by about a quarter point. The eﬀect on the tenure decision depends on the
deﬁnition of home ownership. The share µ(g0 > 0) of households that have a positive level of
housing actually increases by removing the subsidy. Note however, that some of these household
consume more housing services than they own houses, which we would call renters in our model.
The share of households with bigger house than housing services consumption, µ(g0 >h ), on the
other hand, is higher with the subsidy than without, by about 0.7%. In this sense the housing
subsidy increases the fraction of households than own the house they live in.8
In order to provide some intuition for our aggregate results it is instructive to investigate
individual portfolio allocation and consumption decisions, disaggregated by current income and
cash at hand (i.e. wealth). The integration over the stationary distribution over these individual
policy functions then determines the aggregate quantities in this economy. Figure 1 displays the
asset cdf for the ﬁve diﬀerent income shocks z1,...,z5 and indicates that removing the subsidy de-
creases mass at both the lower and upper end of the distribution, consistent with the observation
that it also reduces the wealth Gini coeﬃcient.
Figure 2 plots the demand for real estate g0, as a function of individual household charac-
teristics. We observe that a household with given income and cash at hand demands less real
estate without the subsidy, indicating that the higher rental price without subsidy is more than
oﬀset by higher borrowing rates for all households. In addition, the removal of the subsidy does
not signiﬁcantly alter the asset cutoﬀ point at which households start accumulating housing as-
7Computed as Consumption Equivalent, that is (EVno subs/EVsubs)
1/(1−σ)
8Note, however, that nothing links the housing stock a household owns to the housing services she consumes.
This need not be the same physical house, although it is convenient for the interpretation of our results to make
that association.
15sets. This explains why the measure of households with strictly positive housing assets actually
increases if we eliminate the subsidy. Now remember that the eﬀect on the stationary cash at
hand distribution was that there are fewer households with very low assets without the subsidy.
Thus some households are pushed, without the subsidy, to higher cash at hand positions where
they start saving g0 > 0.
Removing the subsidy has even stronger eﬀects on the decision of whether and how high a
mortgage to take out. Without the subsidy, not only are mortgages lower for all household types,
as ﬁgure 3 indicates. In addition, mortgages drop even more than housing, resulting in a decline
in housing leverage, as documented in ﬁgure 4.9 The lower housing leverage explains the sharp
drop in the fraction of default that we observed in the aggregate statistics.
Somewhat less obvious is the strong impact of the subsidy on the portfolio allocation of
households. This can be seen from ﬁgure 6, which plots the bond share in households’ portfolios,
as a function of the households’ characteristics. Without the subsidy, households uniformly hold
a smaller fraction of their wealth in bonds. This indicates that a lot of bond demand is driven
by the fact that the subsidy reduces borrowing rates substantially. With the subsidy households
simply take out higher mortgages for the same size house (see the increase in leverage documented
above) and invest part of these additional funds in bonds. Note that this investment strategy
obviously does not entail an arbitrage opportunity. While, even after taking into account default
premia, borrowing rates on mortgages may be lower than the risk free interest rate with the
subsidy, investment into housing that is needed to obtain mortgages entails substantial housing
price risk. This limits a households’ willingness to engage in the mortgage borrowing cum bond
investment strategy.10
Another notable feature of the bond portfolio shares is that, with and without subsidy, the
bond share in households’ portfolios is increasing in wealth. While this may sound nonintuitive
at ﬁrst (poorer households put a larger share of their wealth into the risky, rather than the
safe asset), it is in line with recent work on portfolio choice behavior (see Cocco et al. (2003)
or Haliassos and Michaelides (2001)). These authors have argued that it should be households
with high cash at hand that hold a higher share of their portfolio in the save asset. Households
with high net worth tend to be people with high ﬁnancial relative to human wealth (the present
discounted value of future labor income). As such, these households expect to ﬁnance their
current and future consumption primarily with capital income, whereas low cash-at-hand people
tend to rely mostly on their labor income. Thus it is relatively more important for the high
cash at hand people not to be exposed to a lot of ﬁnancial asset return risk. In fact, since labor
income shocks and housing price shocks are uncorrelated in our model, housing is a good asset
for hedging labor income risk (of course the bond is even better in this regard, but has a lower
expected return).
We now turn to a discussion of the welfare consequences of the reform. In terms of aggregate
welfare, removing the subsidy reduces steady state welfare measured as consumption equivalent
by a modest 0.065 of a percent: household consumption (of both nondurables and housing
services) in the steady state without the subsidy has to be increased by this percentage in all
states of the world and for all households, such that a household to be born into the steady state
9There is an increase in leverage for z1 households with very low assets, though this happens at extremely low
real estate holdings.
10As we showed above, there is an endogenous borrowing constraint for mortgage borrowing anyhow, which
would limit the extent of exploiting this strategy even if there were an arbitrage opportunity.
16without the subsidy is indiﬀerent to being born into the steady state with the subsidy. Notice,
however, that the steady state welfare comparison may bias the results in favor of the subsidy.
The steady state without the subsidy has lower steady state wealth and housing stock. Thus
along the transition from the status quo (the steady state with subsidy) towards the steady state
without subsidy a part of that higher wealth and housing stock can be consumed. Thus it is
entirely possible that once the transition dynamics and the welfare eﬀects from that transition
dynamics are explicitly calculated, a reversal of the welfare conclusion obtained in our results is
obtained.
Figure 7 sheds some light on who (that is, households with which characteristics) beneﬁts
from the subsidy. The ﬁgure plots the consumption equivalent gain for households with diﬀerent
income and cash at hand. The same proviso about ignoring the welfare eﬀects along the transition
apply, as before. Therefore this plot should only be understood as a thought experiment of asking
the following question: in which economy would someone with state (a,z) prefer to start her life;
an economy with or without subsidy. Our quantitative results suggest that households with
low wealth prefer to live in an economy without subsidy while high wealth households beneﬁt
strongly from it.11 Also notice that for a given cash at hand level lower income households beneﬁt
more from the subsidy, which is quite intuitive because they carry less of the income tax burden.
Of course, since the wealth distribution conditional on income has a much lower mean for z1
households, low income households obviously beneﬁt the least from the subsidy.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We constructed a model with competitive housing and mortgage markets where the government
provides banks with insurance against aggregate shocks to mortgage default risk. We used this
model to evaluate aggregate and distributional impacts of this implicit government subsidy to
owner-occupied housing. Our main ﬁndings are that the subsidy policy leads to more mortgages
issued and a higher housing stock as well as more mortgage delinquencies. The subsidy mostly
beneﬁts high income and mostly high wealth households. The aggregate welfare eﬀect of the
subsidy is ambiguous so far. In steady state the subsidy generates higher welfare, though this is
partially due to a signiﬁcantly higher housing stock. An explicit characterization of the transition
path induced by eliminating the subsidy is needed to obtain a deﬁnite answer as to whether the
subsidy is indeed welfare improving or not. We defer this to future research.
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Asset CDF with subsidy (solid) and without subsidy (dotted)













































Real Estate with subsidy (solid) and without subsidy (dotted)






























Figure 2: Policy Functions












Mortgage with subsidy (solid) and without subsidy (dotted)


































Figure 3: Policy Functions (cont’d)











Leverage with subsidy (solid) and without subsidy (dotted)






























Figure 4: Policy Functions (cont’d)












Net rental demand with subsidy (solid) and without subsidy (dotted)

































Figure 5: Policy Functions (cont’d)














































Figure 6: Policy Function (cont’d)
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